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With All Due Respect to Plato: The Platonic Orations of Aelius Aristides* 
 
Michael Trapp 
King’s College London, UK 
 
 
<sc>summary<sc>: This article offers a fresh analysis of the tone and argumentative 
strategies of Orations 2–4 of Aelius Aristides. It suggests that they are a more hostile and 
destructive exercise than is normally allowed for and that the recent critical consensus that 
they represent essentially an effort to reconcile philosophy and oratory needs substantial 
revision; these Orations testify instead to the continuing awkwardness of Plato and 
philosophy as components of the Greek cultural heritage in the Imperial period, as well as to 
the ambition of Aristides’ own strategies of self-presentation. 
 
<sc>keywords<sc>: Aelius Aristides, Platonic Orations, Plato, rhetoric, philosophy, imperial 
literature 
 
<sc>Plato in his dialogue the Gorgias, composed sometime in the mid-380s <sc>b.c.e.<sc>,1 
launched a notoriously stinging attack on the intellectual and political claims of oratory and 
its codification as a body of knowledge and techniques. The Socrates of this dialogue insists 
that oratory and its study is not a true science, art or skill (not a true technê), but rather an 
unsystematic, empirical bag of tricks, unsupported by any deeper reflective understanding; it 
is aimed not at establishing and conveying truth and knowledge, but instead at appealing to 
the lower, appetitive urges of its audience, in pursuit of the speaker’s interests rather than 
theirs. On these grounds, it can be categorized as a form not of art or craft (technê), but of 
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mere flattery—kolakeia. Oratory in the abstract is kolakeia, and any actual orator—up to and 
including the greatest orator-statesmen in Athenian history, of the stamp of Themistocles, 
Pericles, Miltiades and Cimon—just a kolax. Importantly, however, the dialogue has a 
constructive as well as a destructive side. To his portrayal of oratory as the perversion of 
good communication (proper use of logos), good values and the right treatment of others, 
Plato opposes the healing ideal of benevolent, candid, truth-seeking philosophical 
conversation (dialectic), embodied of course in the person and example of Socrates. The 
Gorgias thus becomes as much a recommendation of an ideal of philosophy as a demolition 
of the claims of rhetoric.   
Something over five hundred years later,2 Aelius Aristides took issue with this 
dismissal on behalf of oratory in his three Platonic Orations: two enormous treatises, of 466 
and 694 chapters (Orr. 2 and 3), and a shorter epistle of a mere fifty-one (Or. 4). The main 
argumentative weight is borne by Or. 2, A Reply to Plato, in defense of oratory. In this, 
Aristides’ primary aim is to contest the dismissal of oratory as itself as unscientific and 
therefore worthless as an element in human civilization, and to propose an alternative, much 
warmer assessment of its worth; but he responds also incidentally to the criticism of the great 
Athenian orator-statesmen. Or. 3, A Reply to Plato in defense of the Four, focuses instead on 
the criticism of the orator-statesmen. It is thus, in spite of its still greater length (694 chapters 
to 466), a kind of appendix to Aristides’ case, expanding just one element in it at greater 
length than the overall presentation in Or. 2 would allow. Or. 4, finally, is even more 
obviously a subsidiary item. It is a reply to an individual Platonist friend, one Capito,3 
defending not the whole of Aristides’ response, but specifically the use he made in Or. 2 of 
the story of Plato’s visits to Sicily.  
 Why, and how much, does this belated strike-back against Plato matter? To later 
antiquity, from the third to the sixth century <sc>c.e.<sc>, it mattered considerably, to friend 
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and foe alike. In the collected edition of Aristides’ work from which our manuscript tradition 
descends, the Platonic Orations were placed almost at the head, second only to the 
Panathenaic (Or. 1) for their importance in defining their author’s intellectual personality 
and achievement; and in this position, they naturally attracted a heavy volume of annotation, 
in the form of both introductory essays and exegetic notes.4 To philosophers, they constituted 
an attack on Plato substantial enough to demand extensive (and vitriolic) rejection: in the 
third century the Neoplatonist Porphyry composed a refutation in (it is reported) seven books, 
and the controversy reverberates still in the sixth century in Olympiodorus’s commentary on 
the Gorgias, in which Aristides, “the orator and author of the Panathenaicus,” is excoriated 
as a “witterer” (φλήναφος).5 Synesius in his Dio (3.5) in the fourth century likewise cites 
Aristides as an enemy of philosophy, albeit one who combines his enmity with high literary 
quality. 
 In the modern period, in contrast, the Platonic Orations have until quite recently 
seemed of less lively concern. In printed editions from the Giuntine editio princeps (1517) to 
Dindorf’s (1829) they lose their prominent position in the corpus, and to late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century scholarship they are a positive embarrassment.6 Over the last thirty 
years, however, they have come back into the reckoning as significant evidence for the 
universe of Greek paideia under the Roman Empire. This revival of interest has brought with 
it a notable shift in perception. Rather than being taken as testimony to a continuing inter-
disciplinary hostility between philosophy and oratory (rhetoric), they are now in the main 
read and valued as evidence of the accommodation between the two that they, among other 
contemporary and near-contemporary texts, are held to show was comfortably in place by 
this time.7  
 This is a welcome return to favor, and on the face of it seems to find a very useful and 
plausible place for the Platonic Orations as contributors to our understanding both of the 
Michael Trapp 
 4 
culture of the Imperial period, and of Aristides’ own personal project to establish himself as 
one of its leading lights. The argument of this article will however be that such readings get 
the Orations wrong, and correspondingly threaten to skew our view both of Aristides, and of 
the state of play between philosophy and rhetoric as elements of Imperial period paideia. In 
his negotiation between philosophy and rhetoric, and himself and Plato as their champions, 
Aristides is engaged in a less conciliatory, more aggressive and appropriative venture than 
current readings envisage; and this venture is in its turn striking evidence of the continuing 
awkwardness of philosophy and of Plato in his day, in relation not just to rhetoric, but to 
classicizing paideia more generally.  
 In relation to my own past work, I hope that this fresh analysis of the dynamics and 
stakes of the Platonic Orations will, with regard to Aristides, substantiate the much briefer 
and more dogmatic statements about their argumentative thrust in the introduction to my 
Loeb edition of Or. 2;8 as for the standing of philosophy in relation to paideia, I hope here to 
offer a further, and particularly vivid illustration of the picture of uneasy relations that I 
attempted to sketch in my Philosophy in the Roman Empire, and one that refines on it in 
some important respects.9 In so far as this is a study that bears on the reception of Plato in the 
Imperial period, it is also meant to draw attention to a part of the picture notably underplayed 
in Richard Hunter’s otherwise admirable Plato and the Traditions of Ancient Literature, and 
only briefly touched on in Ryan Fowler’s chapter in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of 
Plato in Antiquity.10  
 
<sc>A CONCILIATORY APPROACH?<sc> 
On one level, it is true, Aristides throughout the Platonic Orations maintains a studied—one 
might almost say ostentatiously polite—attitude towards philosophy as a discipline, above all 
as part of his demonstration of how much better he is than Plato at observing the proprieties. 
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Thus, when he rejects Plato’s characterization of oratory as equivalent to cookery in Gorgias 
463a–465c as mere unargued, bullying assertion, he illustrates the point by observing that 
you could with equal justice replace “oratory” with “philosophy” every time Plato uses the 
word in his tirade—but that of course no sane person would ever think to do such a thing (Or. 
2.23–31). The implication is left hanging that philosophy might in fact deserve to be treated 
in this way, but the surface message is the request that oratory be treated with as much 
respect by Plato as Aristides of course shows to philosophy. Similarly, in Or. 2.258–60, he 
argues that a discipline is not automatically discredited by the existence of a few rogue 
practitioners, and points to the cases of atheists and corruptors like Diagoras and Anaxagoras 
to show that this is as true of philosophy as it is of oratory. Here too the surface message is of 
decent respect, even if a damaging innuendo may lurk beneath it.   
It is also very obviously true that at many points in the Platonic Orations Aristides is 
as loud and insistent in his praise of Plato, and in declarations of his own admiration and 
affection, as he is in his praise of (the right kind of) philosophy. At the end of Or. 2, he can 
retrospectively picture the exchange of views between himself and “Plato, the father and 
teacher of orators” as an exchange of toasts between friends, as if at some banquet of the 
cultural aristocracy.11 Defending himself in Or. 4 against Capito’s criticism of the argument 
in Or. 2, he claims to be at one with his critic in valuing Plato “as much as I do my own 
person.”12 In Or. 3 he declares that he “would rather condemn [him]self to the most extreme 
punishment than willingly withhold the highest praise from Plato,” three times characterizes 
him as “the best of the Greeks,” and invokes Aeschylus to underline his refusal to have 
“anyone who is not a friend to this man and does not honor him as he deserves” as “comrade 
in arms or anywhere near me.”13  
Aristides has a very clear and solid motive for highlighting his respect for Plato in this 
way, for Plato is a universally acknowledged representative of the pantheon of great figures 
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of Hellenic paideia that—as we know also from the Sacred Tales—he wishes to be seen as 
belonging himself.14 This consideration perhaps already begins to break cover with the image 
of the aristocratic toast at the end of Or. 2, but is made clearest in the closing stages of Or. 3, 
particularly in the peroration in §§692–94, where after a pained review of what is presented 
as Plato’s baffling and perverse impulses to mock any and every form of Greek cultural 
achievement, from political oratory to tragedy, comedy and dithyramb (605–26, 627–62), 
Aristides exhorts him to forget such silliness and come back into the fold:  
ἡμεῖς δὲ γνωρίζωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ φυρώμεθα ὥσπερ ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ, μηδὲ 
τοῦτό γε ἕν, κακὸν Ἑλληνικόν, μιμώμεθα, στασιάζοντες περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, 
ἀλλ[ά] … παρέχωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ καὶ γιγνώμεθα τοιοῦτοι 
περὶ τοὺς πρότερον οἵουσπερ ἂν αὖ τοὺς ὕστερον εἶναι περὶ ἡμᾶς βουλοίμεθα. 
αἰσχρὸν γάρ, ὥς γ’ ἔφη Δημοσθένης, οὓς οὐδ’ ἂν τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων 
οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀποστερήσειεν τῶν εὐφημιῶν, τούτους ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, οἳ προσήκομεν 
αὐτοῖς, μὴ τῆς γιγνομένης αἰδοῦς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας τυγχάνειν.  
 
[L]et us recognize each other and not become confused like people fighting in the 
dark; let the great Greek vice of splitting into factions to fight over precedence be the 
one that we decline to imitate … keeping to our appointed stations and behaving 
towards those who have gone before us as we would wish those who come after us in 
our turn to behave towards us. As Demosthenes said, it is a shameful thing that those 
whom not even a single one of their personal enemies or opponents in war would rob 
of their good name, should not be granted the proper respect and good will by us, 
their own. 
Recent readings of the Platonic Orations take laudatory and conciliatory moments 
such as these to embody their true thrust and intended final resting-point: after a good fight, 
in which (as the unwritten rules of ancient controversializing certainly allowed) some 
vicious blows may have been landed,15 the contestants shake hands and resume their former 
amicable relations. The argument that now follows will be that this is unsustainable in the 
light of a closer examination of the texture and strategies of Aristides’ argumentation. In 
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fact, he unleashes forces that go far beyond easy reconciliation, into serious undermining of 
both Plato and philosophy; and the “reconciliation” offered on the basis of the sum total of 
all he says is one-sided and appropriative rather than any kind of compromise or meeting in 
the middle. We will look first at the systematic way in which Aristides seeks to undermine 
Plato’s standing and authority as well as the details of his argument in the Gorgias, and then 
at his treatment of the whole calling of philosophy. 
 
<a>THE DISMANTLING OF PLATO’S AUTHORITY<a> 
To say that Plato is on trial in the Platonic Orations, while conveying broadly the right idea, 
is not exact.16 As Antonio Dittadi has correctly underlined, Aristides’ own chosen 
comparison, near the beginning of Or. 2, is with a graphê paranomôn, the indictment and 
scrutiny of a proposed decree or piece of legislation on suspicion of illegality.17 The “illegal 
proposal” in this case is of course the Gorgias and the condemnation of oratory that lies at its 
heart. This is an initial characterization of Plato’s venture that immediately puts him on the 
back foot, as the suspected malefactor, with Aristides as the vigilant defender of right, but it 
does several other things as well: it suggests both that what follows will involve close 
examination of texts and wording, and that issues of consistency (as between new proposal 
and established legislation) will be central. All of this is amply evidenced in the remainder of 
Or. 2 and in Or. 3, to Plato’s deep discredit. 
Plato himself, as the author of the document under examination, is repeatedly 
addressed—interrogated, reproved, exclaimed at—in the second person. The voice 
addressing him is not always Aristides’ own—as for example with the prosopopoea of the 
Four to reproach him on their own account in Or. 3.365–99—but it is for the vast majority of 
the time, and it speaks with utter confidence.18 These notes of confident superiority are at 
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their loudest and most cutting when, as for instance in Or. 2.132–34, Plato is being convicted 
of inconsistency and self-contradiction.  
καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἔφη ὁ Πλάτων, τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου προσπαίζων, ἀλλ' 
ὑμέτερος, ὦ Πλάτων, καὶ τοῦ σοῦ νὴ Δί' ἐργαστηρίου, καὶ τὰς τέχνας ταύτας 
βαναύσους καὶ τοὺς  ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀνδραποδώδεις εἶναι. οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον καὶ 
περιφανὴς συκοφαντία τοῖς μὲν ἃς εἶπον τέχνας εἰδόσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλας μυρίας 
μηδενὸς ἀξιοῦν μετεῖναι χρηστοῦ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην, εἰ δέ τις μὴ τέχνῃ τι 
μετέρχεται, διὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ψέγειν ὡς ἑνὸς τῶν βεβαίως καλῶν στερόμενον, καὶ 
τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς ἅμα μὲν μηδένα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
προφέρειν αὐτὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἅμα δὲ ὡς καθαρῶς ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
σεμνύνειν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ τέχνῃ γίγνηται κακίζοντας. καὶ μὴν ἑλοῦ γε δυοῖν θάτερον, 
εἴποι δικαίως ἂν ἡ ῥητορική, ἢ καὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ὡς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, 
ἢ τούς γε ῥήτορας μὴ ψέγειν, εἰ μὴ τέχνην κέκτηνται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν. 
 
Indeed, ‘the tale is not mine’, as Plato said, playing on the line from Euripides, but 
yours, Plato; it is you and so help me your whole factory, who say that these crafts are 
menial and their practitioners servile. It is then extraordinary and a blatant piece of 
slander to claim that the masters of the crafts I have mentioned, and thousands more, 
are not pursuing any worthwhile activity in the exercise of their science, but at the 
same time, if someone pursues his ends without exercising a science, to criticize him 
for this very reason as lacking one of the securely fine things of life. You people 
simultaneously grant no value to science, but go so far as to use it as a way of 
insulting the masses, and at the same time cry it up as an unsullied good and speak ill 
of anything that does not come about by its agency. “Choose one or the other,” 
rhetoric would have every right to say, either respect craftsmen as gentlemen, or 
refrain from criticizing orators for not being in possession of a science that bears on 
their subject.” 
As already observed, this unmasking of Plato’s inconsistencies is one of the central 
argumentative strategies of both orations, though most particularly of Or. 2. Aristides’ star 
instances, the ones he builds up to most carefully and emphasizes most triumphantly when he 
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produces them, are those internal to the Gorgias itself: the concessions that there can be such 
a thing as a good, knowledge-based, instructive oratory in Grg. 503a, and that there was at 
least one good Athenian orator-statesman, namely Aristides the Just, in Grg. 526b.19 But 
cases such as these are only part of a larger pattern. Also close to the heart of the argument 
are the discrepancies between the differing views taken of “unscientific” discourse in the 
Gorgias and in the Phaedrus (Phdr. 244a–45b, cited and discussed in Or. 2.52–60), and the 
different weight given to avoiding the suffering of wrong as well as avoiding the doing of it 
in the Gorgias and in Epistle Seven (Ep. VII 328c–29a, cited and discussed in Or. 2.285–
300). And both orations are strewn with a series of yet other instances, noted in passing, 
where Plato can again be recruited against himself, to the disadvantage of his case in 
Gorgias: 
Because I do not need many witnesses to prove that a city needs its subsidies and that 
even the haughtiest of its citizens cannot dispense with volunteering funds and 
performing acts of philanthropy; one witness, the very best in Greece, is enough for 
me. Who is that? You, Plato. When furnishing your blessed and virtuous city with 
Guardians—how could a city that has Plato for its founder not be blessed?—you 
specify payment for them from public resources, as if you yourself were not 
recommending anything disgraceful and as if neither party among them, neither the 
prospective givers nor the prospective receivers, were going to do anything 
disgraceful either. If this payment is neither silver nor gold, but something else, that is 
a different point: I think it is perfectly reasonable for forms of payment to be relative 
to types of constitution … what matters is not what form the payment takes, but 
whether you have mentioned payment at all—unless it is the case that Euneos sent the 
Achaeans wine for free, simply because they did not settle up with him with silver, 
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but some “with bronze and some with flashing iron.” Not even Euneos himself said 
anything as idiotic as that.20 
The knowingness of this strategy, of recruiting Plato as witness against his own views, should 
not be underestimated. It is precisely in the Gorgias that Plato most insistently makes self-
consistency a condition of truth,21 and here, Aristides gleefully points out, is Plato himself 
failing to live up to that condition, not only between the Gorgias and his other works, but 
even within the Gorgias itself. The taunt would be compounded if we were justified in 
seeing, with Karadimas and Flintermann, an echo also of Socrates’ insistence in Gorgias 
472b–c that in a proper, philosophical, truth-seeking encounter, the most vital thing is to 
secure the agreement of the one person you are talking to.22 This is perhaps part of the point 
in Or. 2.277–78:  
καὶ μὴν ἐν μὲν οἷς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συνδοκοῦν ἐστιν καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι 
πρόσεστιν· ἃ δ' οὗτος ἐνταῦθα εἴρηκεν, οὐ μόνον τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων λόγοις, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξελέγχεται καὶ λόγοις καὶ βουλήμασιν. ἐκείνων 
μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν συγχωρουμένων καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων μαρτυρεῖ δόξα καὶ 
ψῆφος ὀρθή· ταῦτα δ' εἰ δοίημεν κρατεῖν, ἄπεστιν τὸ ὁτῳοῦν συνδοκεῖν τῶν 
ἄλλων. ἰσχυρότερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἅπασιν καὶ Πλάτωνι τοῦ μηδενὶ καὶ μηδὲ Πλάτωνι 
συνδοκεῖν, ὡς οὗτος ἀλλαχοῦ.  οὐκοῦν οὐ τὴν παρὰ τούτου μαρτυρίαν διὰ τὴν 
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων φευξούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν παρὰ τούτου 
προσθήσομεν.  
 
Moreover, what I say commands agreement from everyone else, and from Plato 
too; but what he says here is proved wrong not only by the voice of fact, but also by 
the words and wishes of Plato himself. If it is allowed that my case is correct, it is 
supported by the opinion and right judgment of everyone else as well; but if we 
were to grant the victory to his argument, then no agreement would be forthcoming 
from anyone else at all. To have everyone’s agreement and Plato’s too is a stronger 
position than having agreement from nobody, not even Plato, as he appears 
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elsewhere. We shall not therefore reject his testimony because of everyone else’s, 
but rather add his to theirs.   
Taking stock so far, we may say that there is a strong element of personal, one-to-one 
confrontationalism in the Platonic Orations, one which indeed already puts them in a class of 
their own as orator’s or rhetorician’s responses to Gorgias; neither Cicero nor Quintilian in 
their reassertions of the scientific status of oratory ever faced up to Plato in such a way as 
this.23 What is also already abundantly clear is the overtly and self-consciously oratorical 
nature of Aristides’ riposte to Plato as the master of dialectic: oratorical not only in overall 
form (the presentation and justification of a graphê paranomôn) but also in argumentative 
strategy (the detection of internal and external inconsistencies). This does not, however, mean 
that Aristides simply refuses to engage with the philosophical texture of the Gorgias, or of 
Plato’s work more generally. 
Detection of inconsistency is a tool of philosophical as well as oratorical polemic, and 
it is one that depends for its impact on close, even if unfriendly familiarity with the words of 
one’s adversary. Aristides makes it very clear in the course of delivering his rebuttal that he 
knows his Plato: that his response to the passage of the Gorgias that he takes as his target is 
grounded in an acquaintance with the collected works which allows him both to cite a very 
wide range of different dialogues, with a good awareness of how their contents compare and 
contrast with the target text, and to engage in close textual scrutiny of key passages. This is 
anything but ignorant and ill-informed criticism. Besides the initial target, Gorgias 463a–65c 
at Or. 2.22, substantial chunks of Plato are cited verbatim in Or. 2.52 (Phdr.), 2.285 (Ep. VII), 
2.304 (Leg.), 2.324–7 (Ep VIII), 2.344–46 (Grg.), 2.438 (Plt.), 2.457 (Euthyd.), 3.272, 280 
and 284 (Ep. VIII), 3.401 (Grg.), 3.489 and 496–97 (Ap.), 3.519 (Ap.), 3.536–39 (Grg.), 
3.560–62 (Leg.), and 3.564 (Phdr.). The total list of works quoted from or referred to 
embraces, besides Gorgias, Phaedrus, Republic, Menexenus, Euthydemus, Apology, Politicus, 
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Laws and Epistles VII and VIII already mentioned, also Alcibiades I, Protagoras, Symposium 
and Timaeus, with the Protagoras in particular, attracting attention on more than one occasion 
and in more than one of its aspects.24 
The operations that Plato’s text is thus subjected to by Aristides suggests comparison 
with several contemporary modes of attention to philosophical works.25 Perhaps most 
obviously, the sustained concentration on just one work is reminiscent of a commentary. For 
Aristides does much more than just scrutinize the wording and reasoning of the primary target 
passage from the Gorgias (463a–65c, quoted verbatim in Or. 2.22). In the loci listed above, 
and in further passages that involve summary rather than substantial direct quotation, he 
examines subsequent stages in Plato’s exposition and argument, passing judgement not only 
on questions of consistency and plausibility, but also of organization and persuasive strategy. 
So, having picked over and rewritten Gorgias 463a–65c in Or. 2.23–31,26 he subsequently 
focuses in the reminder of Or. 2 on the lines of Pindar on nomos quoted by Callicles in Grg. 
484b (2.226–31), the case of the tyrant Archelaus from Grg. 471b–d (2.237–43), the 
discussion of doing versus suffering wrong in Grg. 469b–c (2.261–305), the dismissal of the 
Four in Grg. 515c–19d (2.319–43), and the question of the value of saving lives in Grg. 511c 
ff. (2.362–81). In Or. 3, focusing again on the verdict on the Four, he unpicks and contests the 
illustrative examples (herdsmen, charioteers) that Plato uses to undermine them in Grg. 516a 
and 516e (3.400–408), and in 3.633–42 he suggests how the whole of the conclusion of 
Socrates’ conversation with Callicles about the Four might have been rewritten if Plato had 
been content to adhere to reasonable standards of argumentation. Aristides thus engages with 
the whole texture and sequence of the Gorgias and as already seen tailors his rejoinder so as 
not only to refute its central claims, but also to echo many of its subordinate emphases along 
the way.   
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The parallel with a commentary, however, although certainly suggestive is by no 
means perfect. For one thing, Aristides does not proceed, as Olympiodorus for instance will 
subsequently do with the Gorgias, by the elaborate unfolding of key phrases and the 
unsuspected weight of meaning lurking beneath them,27 and for another the adversarial tone 
and intention do not match up to the standard model of a commentary. From this point of 
view, another comparison suggests itself instead, with the kind of polemical examination of 
an intellectual adversary’s views that is represented by Plutarch’s controversialist essays (e.g., 
Stoicorum Repugnantia, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, Adversus Colotem).28 
Like Aristides, Plutarch seeks to undermine his opponents, not always in the fairest of ways, 
as unwittingly confused and divided against themselves; as with Aristides, the juxtaposition of 
widely separated passages from the opponent is a key tool. On the other hand, Plutarch’s 
controversial works do not confine themselves to single target texts, and are noticeably more 
uncompromising in their desire to annihilate their opponents’ intellectual credit. The Platonic 
Orations, we might then say, flirt with both commentary and controversialist mode, but in the 
end represent a mode of critical engagement identical with neither, and indeed hard to parallel 
at all closely in texts of the period. 
But to return to the theme of the dismantling of Plato’s authority. By his sustained 
critical scrutiny of the Gorgias in comparison with his other relevant output, delivered in a 
consistently confrontational tone, Aristides shows him to be multiply at odds with himself in 
his central claims about oratory and orators, implausible in the intellectual schemata on which 
he relies, and unpersuasive in his selection of illustrative examples. But this is by no means 
all. He convicts him also of ineptitude in his choice of argumentative strategies, deviousness 
in his arrangement of his materials, and casual disregard for factual accuracy.   
The charge of ineptitude is levelled at the beginning of Oration 3, with the observation 
that, in choosing to attack the Four as he did, Plato was doing something not only unnecessary 
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for his main argument about oratory, but also calculated to alienate the very person Socrates 
in the dialogue was trying to persuade, namely Callicles. The criticism is made in 3.4–6, and 
resumed in the suggested rewrite of the ending of the conversation with Callicles that is made 
in 3.633–42. The charge of deviousness comes in Oration 2.348–50, where Aristides 
comments on how Plato sought to conceal the damaging admission of a contradiction between 
his scorn for the Four and his praise of Aristides the Just by tucking the latter away, much 
further on in the dialogue than the former, where it would be less conspicuous: “I do not think 
it is unintentional or insignificant or casual that this mention sits somewhere in the middle of 
the myth; Plato put it there so as to conceal it as far as possible, and so that, if someone did 
find it and make use of it, it would not be thought that he had ignored it.”  
Most striking of all is the development given to the charge of deliberate carelessness 
over fact. Having summarized the multiple ways in which Plato is inconsistent with himself in 
3.511–76, Aristides moves on in 577–87 to observe that the freedom Plato thus allows himself 
from normal standards extends beyond this, to his diction, his chronology and his 
nomenclature. The main examples he cites are the chronological impossibilities involved in 
having Socrates in the Menexenus refer to the Peace of Antalcidas, which was made (counting 
up the archons) fourteen years after his execution,29 and in having Socrates, Agathon, 
Aristophanes and a still young Alcibiades in the same place at the same time in the 
Symposium; but he swipes also at Aristophanes’ hiccups in Symposium (clearly in his view 
just invented for satirical purposes) and at what he sees as a willful confusion of Naucratis 
with Hermoupolis in the Phaedrus.30 It all points to the conclusion, he suggests, that Plato’s 
dialogues overall are “pretty much fictions (plasmata), which can be woven together from 
whatever elements one chooses” and show “a less than pressing concern for truth.” This is a 
striking characterization of the dialogues, which rightly attracted Flintermann’s attention,31 
but it is of course in context anything but a disinterested piece of literary criticism, as is 
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underlined by the conclusion to this phase of Aristides’ argumentation. As a final instance of 
Plato’s slippery unreliability as a writer, he reminds his audience, with what looks like a 
mixture of impatience and incredulity, of the famous disclaimer from Epistle II: “‘there is no 
piece of writing by Plato, nor will there ever be … these are instead the works of a Socrates 
grown young and handsome.’ So (eita) were they written not by the man who wrote but by 
the man who did not?”32 
For all that he acknowledges Plato as a master-orator (Orr. 2.15, 2.465, 3.73, etc.), 
Aristides thus clearly enjoys eating away at his credit, and puts a great deal of energy and 
ingenuity into doing so, both in invention and in delivery. Much of his criticism, 
unsurprisingly, is rhetorical in orientation, teaching Plato lessons in good argumentative 
strategy and persuasive propriety. But there is also a definite sense of Plato being challenged 
on his own philosophical and expressive territory as well. For a philosophical intellect, it is 
surely bad news to have it pointed out that one’s conceptual categories fly in the face of 
universal experience (Or. 3.588–604), or that crucial, load-bearing arguments depend on 
neglecting crucial facts about causation in the human world (Or. 3.461–98), or on failure to 
appreciate the true implications of one’s own terminology (Or. 2.135–77); and still worse 
news to be convicted over and over again of failure to show a characteristic (consistency) that 
one has oneself insisted on in the work in which, more than any other, one has set out to 
define good philosophical method. For someone who has made dialogue—reported 
philosophical conversation—central to his work, it is demeaning to be told that one of his 
more substantial efforts takes a radically wrong direction, and to have the offending stages 
rewritten for him (Or. 3.633–42, cf. 2.23–31). For someone who has made philosophical myth 
a significant element in his dialogues, it is again a blow to have one of them appropriated and 
rewritten for purposes of which he would strongly disapprove—as Aristides does with his 
revision and repurposing of the Protagoras myth in favor of oratory in Or. 2.394–99.   
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Active rewriting, which we find with the foundation myth of oratory, and the revisions 
to two key passages of the Gorgias, indeed implies that the rewriter is not just an armchair 
critic, but can do these things better in actual practice. The implication is reinforced by a 
number of further passages in which Aristides essays something more like free composition of 
his own in philosophical mode.33 A neat example is provided by Or. 2.105–7. Here Aristides 
constructs a quick-fire logical chain of argument, to establish the priority of invention over 
learning, and thus of natural ability over human science. If only briefly, we have a burst of 
dialectic; but this burst of dialectic is delivered by the orator Aristides, just to show he can do 
it every bit as well as any philosopher ever could: 
εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ μαθεῖν ἄριστον καὶ πρῶτον, οὐδὲ ἂν αὐτὸ πρῶτον τὸ μαθεῖν ἦν. 
ἐχρῆν γὰρ δήπου μαθεῖν παρ' ἑτέρου. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἦν ὁ διδάσκων πρῶτος, εἰ τὸ 
μαθεῖν  κρεῖττον καὶ πρῶτον ἦν. παρὰ τοῦ γάρ, ὦ καὶ σὺ τὴν ποικίλην 
κοσμήσας, ἀκούσῃ, τίσι πεισθῇ, εἰ κρείττων ὁ μαθών ἐστι τοῦ τὸ πρῶτον 
εὑρόντος, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκῃ δεύτερος, εἴπερ τι μέλλει μαθήσεσθαι.  πᾶς γὰρ ὁ 
μανθάνων ὡμολόγηκεν δήπουθεν εἶναι χείρων αὐτῷ γε τῷ δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν· ὡς εἴ 
γε μὴ πείσειεν αὑτὸν δεῖσθαι πρότερον, πῶς ἂν μάθοι, ἢ πῶς ἄλλῳ γ' ἂν εἰπόντι 
πεισθείη; οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον τόν γε αὐτὸν ὡμολογηκότα εἶναι χείρω, τοῦτον 
ἀμείνω καλεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐπαινούμενον, ὅτι ὡμολόγηκεν χείρων 
εἶναι.  
 
Because if learning were best and came first, learning would not in fact come first, 
since there would of course have to be someone else to learn from, so that the teacher 
would not be first, if learning were superior and came first. You, sir, who adorned the 
Painted Stoa, tell me who he is to learn from, and what lessons he is to learn, if the 
learner is really superior to the man who invents things in the first place, and not 
necessarily second, if he is going to learn anything? Any learner surely automatically 
confesses to being inferior by the very fact of needing to learn, since if he had not first 
convinced himself of his need, how could he learn, or take heed of someone else’s 
words? It is thus strange to call better the one who has confessed himself to be 
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inferior, and is moreover commended for the very action of confessing himself 
inferior.34 
Enclosed within the oratorical form of Orr. 2 and 3, therefore, we find not only 
critique of Plato’s performance in argument and as composer of dialogues, but also mimetic 
rewriting of selected Platonic passages and free composition in philosophizing style. When a 
couple of further factors are taken into account, it becomes not just legitimate but highly 
tempting to ask whether these are the signs of a conscious, and once more highly aggressive, 
strategy on Aristides’ part. As already observed, Plato throughout both orations is repeatedly 
addressed in the second person, in criticism, challenge and reproach. The initial basis for this 
is his status as “defendant” in the examination that Aristides is conducting, which 
automatically puts him in line for a certain amount of direct address; but there are places 
where the second person mode is notably extended, and some where it edges close to open 
dialogue—more in the style of Plato’s adaptation of forensic style in the Apology (the 
interpolated “dialogue” with Meletus in 24c–28a) than that of a standard oratorical product.  
So, for instance in Or. 2.141–2, Aristides constructs an imagined exchange between an 
unnamed interlocutor (standing for himself) and Plato on the definition of archery, with a 
clear verbal echo of Grg. 451b:  
Think pray what would happen if someone were to ask him, using his very own turn 
of phrase, “Plato, do you know a science of archery, at least so as to be able to speak 
of it, and use that name? You have certainly given an exhaustive account of political 
science and established with precision what its subdivisions are.” “Yes I do know it,” 
he would say, “and I do use that name.” “So what is it, and what does it undertake to 
do?” “To hit the target in the firing of projectiles.” “Good.  Then when it takes aim, it 
hits the target?” “Of course.” “Is it therefore not a science because of the fact that it 
takes aim, or is it the science of just this, taking aim?” “The latter, I believe.” 
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In the same vein Plato is made to answer back 2.279–88, on the strength of Epistle VII, about 
his motives for visiting Sicily; and in 3.306–7, again in connection with the Sicilian 
adventure, Aristides once more apostrophizes a Plato under attack and answering back to his 
critics. The effect is only enhanced when, in passages such as 3.135 or 3.302, Plato is 
addressed with his own vocatives (ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή, etc).35 On another level, a 
sense of dialogue, this time more clearly between Plato and Aristides, is fostered by the sheer 
quantity of verbatim quotation from his works: Plato speaks directly, from his works, on page 
after page, and the texture of both orations becomes for the reader an alternation between his 
voice and Aristides’.  
Critics have duly noted the intimations of dialogue, and Dittadi in particular has 
examined more generally the extent to which the Platonic Orations might be viewed as an 
exercise in the corrective rewriting of Plato,36 but there may be a more forceful point to be 
made here, about the shrewdness and skill as well as the mechanics of Aristides’ polemical 
strategy. Rewriting is of course a procedure with a long pedigree and deep roots in rhetorical 
culture, in both more and less pointed forms, from the confrontational device of refutatio 
sententiae to the kinds of appreciative paraphrase (paraphrasis) recommended as training by 
Quintilian and Theon and (according again to Theon) exemplified repeatedly in the speeches 
of Demosthenes.37 An extra dimension however accrues when the target author is Plato. For 
Plato himself was a great rewriter and parodist, as evidenced, among many possible examples, 
by the speeches of the Symposium (especially the first five, from Phaedrus to Agathon), 
“Aspasia’s” funeral oration in the Menexenus, or the ventriloquizing of Lysias in the 
Phaedrus or Protagoras and Hippias in the Protagoras. Rewriting Plato is thus at the very 
least another neat piece of table-turning, justified ad hominem by his own provocative 
practice. But more yet may be at stake.  
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Recent criticism—above all Andrea Wilson Nightingale in her 1995 study Genres in 
Dialogue38—has painted a convincing picture of Plato as himself a purposeful generic 
aggressor, who in his parodies and imitations sets out to appropriate whole rival forms of 
expression—tragedy, comedy, “Presocratic” natural science, epideictic oratory—and thus to 
relativize them to philosophy as a master discourse. Platonic parody and pastiche in this 
perspective emerge as elements in a larger strategy rather than merely localized pieces of 
teasing and play. We have seen Aristides, manifestly in some sense paying Plato back in his 
own coin in quotation, cross questioning and rewriting. But if we can also see him—as will 
emerge below39—claiming philosophy as a subordinate kind of oratory, by which it is, or 
should be, in some sense enclosed and controlled, does it not begin to seem plausible to credit 
him too with a larger generic vision, articulated in theory but also enacted in the actual texture 
of the orations? In allowing Plato to speak, engaging in direct and indirect exchange with him, 
trading myth for myth, analytical schema for analytical schema, and stretch of reasoning with 
stretch of reasoning, he also engulfs him, along with the whole discourse of philosophy for 
which he stands, in an oratorical embrace—oratorical in overall form and structure, in 
strategies of argumentation, and in the self-presentation of the principal speaking voice. Plato 
may stage dialogues, in which there is the appearance of an interplay between independent 
voices, but this apparent polyphony is a sham, masking the responsibility of a single 
playwright.40 Besides corralling Plato within his oratorical structure, Aristides can also claim 
the greater honesty, in admitting—indeed, loudly asserting—his own responsibility for the 
whole product. 
 
<a>CHARACTER ASSASSINATION?<a> 
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Aristides’ assault on Plato’s credit does not however end with issues of argumentative 
competence and generic priority. Also at issue are Plato’s own record of practical action, and 
his character. 
Where the practical record is concerned, the main exhibit, scrutinized in both Oration 
2 and Oration 3, is the Sicilian venture.41 In Or. 2.279–98, the (moderately, if backhandedly 
flattering) point of the scrutiny is to show that, whatever he may have said pour besoin de la 
cause in the Gorgias, in actual practice Plato attached as much importance to preventing the 
suffering of wrong as he did to preventing the doing of it; otherwise he would not have tried 
as very hard as Epistle VII shows he did to save his friend Dion from being wronged. In 
Oration 3.306–7 and 368–72, however, the emphasis shifts to the ineffectiveness of his 
interventions: despite his best efforts, Plato failed both to help Dion and to improve 
Dionysius, and suffered a string of personal indignities into the bargain—in marked contrast 
to the sterling records of the Four. These indignities included (3.440–45) being subjected to 
just the kind of disloyalty on the part of close associates that Plato tried to make such a 
reproach against the Four. Besides his own record, moreover, Plato is also discredited by 
association with Socrates, whose “achievements” in making the people of Athens pointlessly 
talkative (3.70–71) and in failing to improve his close associates (3.433–39) made the 
shortcomings of the Four seem venial by comparison. Not wholly consistently with this, 
Aristides tries also to do Plato down by driving a number of wedges between him and his 
fellow Socratics: in divergences between him and Xenophon (2.301–3), and in the signs he 
claims to detect that Plato was not above misrepresenting even his master Socrates on 
occasion—as witness the discrepancy between the Platonic Socrates’s view of Pericles and 
that taken by the Socrates recorded by the more prosaic, but therefore more reliable Aeschines 
(3.348–51). 
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On the question of loyalty, inferences about the facts of the career join up with 
inferences about character, which constitute a final, and in some ways, most insidiously 
damning line of attack. Two traits, already well noted by Pernot,42 stand out in Aristides’ 
account. The first is Plato’s perverse competitiveness (philonikia), his obsessive desire to do 
down perceived rivals, especially if they are otherwise distinguished. Aristides highlights this 
unlovely trait briefly in Or. 4, in justifying his own use of the facts of the Sicilian venture to 
criticize Plato in Or. 2.43 A more elaborate treatment comes, however, towards the end of 
Oration 3, in paragraphs 605–26, where Plato’s jealous attacks on any and every icon of 
Hellenism are unfavorably contrasted with the more discriminating vitriol of Archilochus’s 
satire (610–12), and where the celebrated command to Socrates to “make music” (Phd. 60e–
61b) is reinterpreted as even better advice to his wayward pupil (624–26). But unfavorable 
comment on the same tendency is also passed in Orr. 2.161 and 320 and 3.567. The other 
main character trait of Aristides’ Plato takes us back to the allegation of carelessness over 
factual accuracy, made in Or. 3.577–87. For Aristides has a diagnosis of what lies at its root, 
and is also, to some extent, responsible for his disrespect for the greats of the past. The 
problem lies in Plato’s natural genius, the sheet greatness of his nature (577, 586, 663). It is 
this that induces a lofty, aristocratic (Aristides actually says “kingly”) scorn for reputation and 
for pedantic precision, and this in turn on occasion tips him over the edge from legitimate 
disagreement into casual, insouciant insults and factual slips that his better part does not really 
intend.  
This is wonderfully clever polemic. It offers a deliciously, teasingly weighted verdict, 
ambiguously balanced between acknowledgement of Plato as a superior being, to whom 
normal criteria do not apply, and reproof to him for a kind of silliness he could and should 
have known better than to succumb to. As such, it provides a particularly subtle answer to the 
old question of how to play off discontent with Plato against the necessity of acknowledging 
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his genius. At the same time this is a strategy which also, with one of its two poles, offers one 
of the most deeply dismissive characterizations of Plato of them all.   
In this connection, it pays to consider not only the argumentative panache of the 
Platonic Orations in themselves, but also their place in a longer history of engagements with 
Plato. In one perspective, the insistently personal tone of their response, and their willingness 
to go further in carrying the fight to the opposition, makes them stand out in comparison with 
attempts to negotiate with the Plato of the Gorgias on the part of other, earlier defenders of 
oratory and rhetoric, such as Cicero and Quintilian.44 But in another perspective, they can at 
the same time be seen as firmly inserted into a longer anti-Platonic tradition: that known to us 
now above all from Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Athenaeus, and their retrospection on 
other earlier figures now lost to us such as Zoilus and Herodicus.45  
In the first place, whatever else he is working with or reacting to, Aristides must 
across the three orations be engaging, directly or indirectly, with the critically slanted 
treatment of Platonic style in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s On the Style of Demosthenes and 
Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius. Scholars have pointed to the parallel between Dionysius’s 
unapologetic apology in the Letter for his censure of Plato’s “dithyrambic” tendencies in the 
Demosthenes, and Aristides’ in the Response to Capito for his use of Plato’s Sicilian 
adventures in Oration 2.46 But the parallel arguably extends also to the spirit of the initial 
criticism as well: Aristides’ diagnosis of Plato going irresponsibly with the flow of his “great 
nature” looks suspiciously like a development of Dionysius’s more restrictedly stylistic 
judgement, which also censures Plato’s (“dithyrambic”) excesses as an almost accidental 
falling below his own high standards (Dem. 6: τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁμαρτήματα ἐν ταῖς 
κατασκευαῖς εἴωθεν ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ χείρων .. αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίνεται); the temptation to 
make this association is only increased by the fact that both Aristides and Dionysius are in the 
business of unfavorable comparisons between Plato and Demosthenes, with Aristides again 
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expanding what is for Dionysius a stylistic judgement into a broader assessment of character 
and motivation. 
But engagement with the anti-Platonic tradition can also be seen in the chronological 
arguments of Or. 3.577–87. The focus on the blatant anachronisms of Symposium in particular 
recalls the attacks on Platonic chronology reported in Book 5 of Athenaeus’s Deipnosophists, 
where very similar comments are made about the impossibility of bringing that particular 
cast-list together in the same place at the same time, together with further complaints about 
the relative dating of Pericles and Archelaus in the Gorgias (503c), and the grand but 
impossible gathering of sophists in the Protagoras.47 Like everything in Athenaeus, this 
assault on Plato is reported from earlier sources, apparently in particular the second-century 
<sc>b.c.e.<sc> critic Herodicus (“Herodicus the Cratetean”) in his work entitled To the 
Socrates-lover,48 though other sources too may be being laid under contribution at this point, 
perhaps from the list of anti-Platonists provided by Dionysius at Ep. Pomp. 757 
(Cephisodorus, Theopompus, Zoilus, Hippodamus, Demetrius, “and many others”). Here too 
at all events we see a longer-running story in the reception of Plato to which Aristides in the 
Platonic Orations is making his own unique contribution, building the chronological worry 
into a larger picture of Plato’s perceived shortcomings as both author and agent. And it is an 
affinity that once more emphasizes the aggressive set of the Orations, and the inadequacy of a 
conciliationist reading. 
 
<a>THE TAMING OF PHILOSOPHY<a> 
Plato, then, is ostensibly praised, but under cover of this token show of respect is relentlessly 
battered across all three of the Orations, both over the specifics of his criticism of oratory and 
over his life, character and writings more generally. It may still in a sense be right to say, 
with Pernot, that Aristides is seeking to find “a Plato acceptable to the orators,” but what is 
now clear is that this Plato he is after is a severely chastened and controlled one: accepted as 
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a genius and as the Hellenic icon Aristides wants him to be, only on condition he relinquishes 
the extremes and perversities into which that genius can carry him. How is it then with the 
calling he stands for, philosophy?  
Aristides’ surface expressions of respect for philosophy have already been noted, but 
as was the case with Plato, they are very far from being the whole story. Woven through the 
fabric of both orations is both a more overt marginalization of philosophy as a discipline and 
a series of less veiled disparagements of philosophers.49 Much of this is of course delivered 
via what is said about Plato, as the supreme representative of the calling: where he is shown 
to fall down in motivation and in technical competence, the discipline is disparaged too. But 
the attack is also pressed home on a broader front. Most fundamentally, the picture of the 
nature of oratory that Aristides constructs in rebutting Plato’s criticisms seems to be claiming 
not only a parity of esteem with philosophy, but a positive superiority, such as at least to 
subordinate its rival, and perhaps to squeeze it out altogether.  
Both maneuvers hinge on the term and concept at the center of the tussle with Plato 
and the Gorgias, logos. In Or. 2.450, in the course of finally rejecting the notion that there 
can be any such thing as a bad form of oratory (since “bad oratory” is simply not oratory at 
all), Aristides remarks in passing that “One might even say, whether correctly or not, that 
dialectic may perhaps be a category of oratory, just as questions are a category of speech 
(logos) in general. But let us leave that for another time.” And in Or. 3.509, in contrasting 
Plato with Demosthenes, he says: 
μή τῳ φαυλοτέρα τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἡ ῥητορικὴ φαίνεται. καίτοι ἔγωγ’ ᾤμην οὐ 
πάνυ ταῦτ’ ἀλλήλων κεχωρίσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέρος τι τῆς 
ῥητορικῆς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἐρώτησιν τοῦ παντὸς λόγου, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον 
ὅνπερ τοῖς δρομεῦσι μέτεστι τοῦ βαδίζειν, οὐ μὴν τοῖς βαδίζουσιν ἅπασι τὸ θεῖν 
οἷόν τε, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς πρὸς τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς ἔχειν. 
 
Let nobody think oratory inferior in value to dialectic. I myself would have thought 
that the two are not entirely separate from each other, and that dialectic is a 
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constituent part of oratory, just as the question is a part of speech in general, and that 
in the same way as people running can also be said to walk, but not all who walk are 
able to run, so things also stand between orators and dialecticians.50   
Philosophy is thus reduced to the status not simply of a parallel discipline, but a definite 
subordinate, albeit one that in theory might still have some non-negligible role to play. In Or. 
2. 204–46, moreover, Aristides goes still further: in order to prove that oratory, beyond being 
just “not irrational” is in fact “rational to the highest degree” (pleiston logou metechon) and 
“the highest thing a man might pray for,” he assigns it a hegemonic role in legislation and the 
administration of justice, and thus to the order and flourishing of communal human life in 
general. As is also underlined in the Platonizing myth that follows in 2.394–99, cheekily 
adapted from the Protagoras,51 this assigns to oratory a position others—Plato especially, in 
the Republic still more emphatically than in the Gorgias—would give to philosophy. If this is 
what oratory is in Aristides’ vision, and this is where it stands, does philosophy have any 
useful role to play, even as a subordinate discipline?   
Philosophers themselves are moreover routinely satirized for their pretension and 
over-claiming. In Oration 2.380–81, Aristides comments sarcastically that for all the airs they 
give themselves and the social privileges they claim on the basis of their benefactions, they 
are really no more entitled to gratitude than nurses, schoolmasters and paidagôgoi who (to 
their credit) make no such fuss about themselves.52 In 3.243 and 258 they are “those who 
fester in their cheap philosopher’s mantles” and “philosophize in safety,” incapable of acts of 
practical moral heroism in the real world. In 3.315, they are “the men with long trailing 
beards … who venerate Plato to this extreme.” These casual, passing sneers have nothing 
very original about them—they resonate for instance with many of Lucian’s 
characterizations53—but they create a definite atmosphere of disparagement, at odds with any 
assertions of respect. 
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All of this already suggests a different version of the balancing act that can also be 
observed a century earlier in Quintilian’s discussion of Plato, the Gorgias and the claims of 
philosophy in the Institutio.54 Like his predecessor, Aristides seems unwilling to forgo either 
the pleasures of pulling philosophers down a peg or two, or the credit for showing his 
appreciation a high intellectual venture; but his inclinations seem much more firmly tilted 
towards the former. Philosophy, like Plato, is cumulatively, through Orr. 2 and 3, being 
chastened and controlled. Both the product and its practitioners—even the greatest of them—
are firmly and none too gently reminded of their legitimate place in the scheme of things and 
stripped of their pretensions to anything more exalted than the facts allow. The final payoff of 
this process comes, fittingly, towards the very end of Or. 3, where it is tellingly woven 
together with a final twist to Aristides’ critical analysis of Plato’s corrosive competitiveness 
and lofty disregard for fact and propriety. 
We have already noted how, in Or. 3.605–26, and indeed in the succeeding 
paragraphs too, Aristides draws attention to the way that Plato’s attitudes put him 
discreditably at odds not just with oratory and with the majority view of the Great Four 
Athenian statesmen, but with Hellenic values more generally. In pointing this out, Aristides, 
as Plato’s reviewer and corrector, constitutes himself correspondingly as champion not just of 
oratory, but of Hellenism tout court. As §§ 607–9 make explicit, he now speaks for Hellenic 
culture as a whole, for all the greats whom Plato has insouciantly, uncharitably belittled: not 
just the Great Four Athenian statesmen, but also Homer; not just Homer but also the poets of 
comedy, tragedy and dithyramb as well. Once you add them all up, you can see just how 
broad a sweep of Hellenic cultural icons Plato has seen fit to slight, and just how out of tune 
he is with the finest Greek feeling–just imagine what a Spartan, let alone an Athenian, would 
say about his disrespect to his elders, and to the honored dead of the great past (646–62)! It is 
all so stupidly unnecessary: because it is not actually needed to make the argument of the 
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Gorgias cohere, even on Plato’s terms (627–45), and because Plato himself at other 
moments, when he is not indulging his perverse competitive desire to do everyone else down, 
can (and should) look as Hellenic as the best of them (605, 616).   
Thus, Plato is challenged to come off the fence in his attitude to Hellenic culture: will 
he go with his better instincts, or stick with the perverse, discreditable temptation to distance 
himself? But with the next breath, in §§ 663–691, which make up the last substantial thrust of 
the whole confrontation, Aristides also challenges him to position himself with respect to 
philosophy. Certain reprehensible contemporaries, he reports, have mistakenly assumed that 
they have Plato’s authority for renewed assaults on the good name of the Greek classics, up 
to and including Demosthenes, and equally mistakenly assumed that in so doing they are 
behaving as good philosophers should. In fact, both this and their attitude and behavior more 
generally disqualify them from any such title: they are scruffy, importunate, hypocritical 
charlatans, who flout all standards of social propriety and literate expression, and do not even 
know what the words ‘sophist’ and ‘philosopher’, which they bandy about so freely, actually 
mean.  
It is easy to conclude, as many critics have, that Aristides is here speaking of 
contemporary, perhaps Pergamene Cynics;55 a good deal of what he says does indeed fit this 
model. If so, then Aristides will be using them as a last scare tactic for Plato: seeing in them 
what distasteful effects his own disrespect for the classics can lead to should give him all the 
reason he needs to renounce it in himself. But I think things are more interestingly 
complicated than that. Quite apart from the fact that it is not at all clear why Cynics in 
particular could plausibly be supposed to have taken Plato as their model, the objects of 
Aristides’ indignation have moments of sounding at least as much like school-based, 
theorizing philosophers as they do like Cynics (in § 672 they are spoken of as “ducking into 
their lairs” and “practicing their wonderful cleverness” there, “prating at shadows” and 
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“making rope out of sand”). So it is from the wrong sort of philosopher more generally, 
rather than just from Cynics that Plato is being encouraged to distance himself. On top of 
this, Aristides slides in a discussion of the meanings of the words “sophist” and 
“philosopher,” in the course of which he intimates that Plato himself uses the latter term two 
senses (ch. 680): sometimes he keeps it only for people who believe in the Forms, and the 
inferiority of physical entities; but at other times, he uses it as everyone else does, to apply 
much more generally to lovers of learning and goodness. There is at least the hint of a 
suggestion here that, if Plato is really to put himself in the clear, he needs to drop not only the 
corrosive contempt that threatens to align him with Cynics, but also the weirder, more 
implausible features of his own philosophy. 
If that is right, then in this final sweep of his suite of Platonic Orations, Aristides is 
raising questions about Plato not just in his outward relationship with the rest of Greek 
culture, but also in the scope of his own philosophy, and thus also questioning the 
relationship of philosophy to the rest of Greek culture. And in challenging Plato personally to 
put himself in the clear, he is of course raising an issue for readers of the Orations as well: 
how are they (how are we) to “place” this extraordinary, non-Hellenic Hellene? It is meant to 
be an awkward question for Plato—whichever way he goes, he is going to have to sacrifice 
something of himself; and if it is an awkward question for Plato, then it points up an 
awkwardness for his readers too. 
 
<a>ARISTIDES, PLATO AND PHILOSOPHY: THE FINAL ACCOUNT<a> 
In sum, then, although the recent critical consensus that sees in the Platonic Orations 
essentially a work of conciliation and integration between oratory and philosophy is not 
wholly wrong, it does require very substantial adjustment. If these texts hold out the offer of 
a reconciliation, it is one to be concluded entirely on Aristides,’ and oratory’s, terms, which 
require in fine that both Plato and philosophy abandon any claim to a transcendent critical 
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vantage-point outside of conventional, mainstream culture and values. Aristides demands 
concessions from Plato, but offers none on his own account. He invites philosophy to accept 
a position in the scheme of things categorically subordinate to oratory, and Plato to 
acknowledge his errors and misjudgments, which Aristides has been better able to identify 
than he was, and return meekly to the fold of the acknowledged classics. He controls Plato 
both by cataloguing his failures and flaws, in character, judgement and literary technique, and 
by weaving his philosophical words into a total structure that is not philosophy but oratory. 
And he repeatedly shifts the blame for his own aggression onto Plato’s own procedures, in 
the Gorgias and in other dialogues—it was Plato who started it, and everything that Aristides 
does is only playing him back in his own coin.56 The masterly portrayer of the Socratic 
elenchus himself falls victim to a superior cross-examination, but can redeem himself by 
dropping the silly nonsense that (according to Aristides, at any rate) not even he really 
believes in. 
 All of this makes good sense in terms of Aristides’ personal project, as we know it 
both from the Platonic Orations and from his other works—above all the Sacred Tales and 
Orr. 33 and 3457—of establishing himself, through his status as the master orator of his day, 
as a standard-bearer of the great Hellenic tradition more generally. In this connection it is 
particularly noteworthy how, as the pressure on Plato increases through Or. 3, so echoes of 
Demosthenes, and direct appeals to his personal example, grow more noticeable.58 But this is 
in turn just one strand in a more pervasive strategy in the Platonic Orations, in which by 
quotation and appeal to example Aristides regularly lines himself up with not only the great 
political and military achievers of honored tradition (above all, of course, the Four, but also 
his own namesake Aristides the Just), but also their chroniclers, Thucydides and Plato’s 
fellow, but better minded Socratics, Xenophon and Aeschines.59 And this feature of the 
Platonics is matched in the other great work to which they are juxtaposed in the manuscript 
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tradition, the Panathenaic Oration, in which Aristides as the most comprehensive encomiast 
of the glories of Athens aligns himself both with the Athenian heroes of old and with the 
great Attic writers.60 Taming Plato and enabling him to take a safe and unthreatening place 
inside the same cultural fold at one stroke removes a potentially awkward critic and enhances 
the aura of the pantheon which Aristides himself aspires to join.61 
 But what of philosophy? I have argued elsewhere that philosophy as an institution in 
the Hellenistic and (especially) the Roman imperial periods occupies a finely-balanced and 
thus potentially precarious position.62 On their side, philosophers lay claim both to centrality 
(as holders of a unique key to a fulfilled human existence, and indeed a fully human 
existence) and to a transcendent, external vantage-point from which everything in the normal 
world can be seen in its true value. For them, even as they claim to lay bare the essence of the 
world and of true human values, any and every element in ordinary, conventional existence, 
up to and including the most time-honored and cherished, is in principle liable to 
philosophical scrutiny and dismissal. Their surrounding society (“laypeople,” idiôtai, in 
philosophers’ terms) responds by seeing them both as leading lights of civilization–not only 
masters of knowledge and insight in the modern world, but also jewels in the glorious past 
record of Hellenic culture—and as bizarre and eccentric outsiders, whose contrarian views on 
the values and pieties of the normal world can and should be resisted and deflected. The 
resulting tension manifested itself on a number of levels. The best recognized is that of elite 
education, with the tussle, long ago diagnosed and described by von Arnim in his 
contextualization of Dio Chrysostom, between oratorical and rhetorical study for top position 
in the curriculum.63 But education—as the very word paideia reminds us–is not a sealed 
compartment: its tensions and conflicts reflect and create those in society more widely. In this 
context Aristides’ Platonic Orations have a unique interest precisely for the way that—as no 
other surviving ancient text does—they engage with philosophy and its perceived 
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awkwardness on both the narrower and the broader front, on behalf both (more narrowly) of 
the practice and study of oratory and (more broadly) of the values and pieties of Hellenic 
culture.  
 To describe what is going on in the Platonic Orations as essentially an exercise in 
reconciliation thus seems seriously to undervalue their interest and importance in a number of 
ways. In particular, it risks undervaluing the acuteness and resourcefulness of Aristides’ 
choice of target. In setting himself to respond to the Plato of the Gorgias, he opened up the 
possibility of doing much more than simply producing yet one more defense of oratory 
against Plato’s criticism, following tamely in the footsteps of Cicero and Quintilian, for he 
saw, as they had not, the possibility of using the Gorgias to take up the broader cultural as 
well as the narrower technical or educational issue. The resulting work had multiple 
advantages, both intellectually and personally for Aristides. Intellectually, the range of his 
argument made it a truer response to the Gorgias precisely because it acknowledged that the 
stakes of Plato’s attack went beyond the status of oratory and rhetoric to larger questions of 
value. In terms of his own personal aspirations, responding to the text in which Plato most 
clearly challenged both oratory and conventional culture gives him too the opportunity to put 
himself forward as a champion on both fronts: as vindicator not only of the value of oratory, 
but also of Hellenic paideia more generally. Aristides in the Platonic Orations throughout 
plays to win, on all their levels of engagement, and the conflicts from which he aims to 
emerge victorious are real ones. 
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* I am very grateful to audiences in London, Glasgow and Lille who have responded over the 
last few years to preliminary versions of this article, to my KCL colleague Pavlos Avlamis 
and the two anonymous referees provided by the journal for criticism that has pushed me to 
clarify and concentrate my argument, and to the journal’s editor, Andromache Karanika, for 
her comments and guidance. 
1 For the dating, see Dodds 1959:18–30, esp. 24–25. 
2 Dating any of these works is tricky. Relative to each other, Or. 3 must come after Or. 2, and 
Or. 4 in between the other two, but absolute dates are harder to be sure of. Between 145 and 
147 <sc>c.e.<sc> (the period of Aristides’ residence in the Pergamum Asclepieum, the so-
called kathedra) is plausible on the strength of Or. 2.66–73 and 430–36, but by no means 
obligatory; the other two orations offer even less by way of dating evidence. Cf. (with 
caution) Behr 1968a: 54–56 with n52 and 94–95 with n2 (arguing for 161–65 
<sc>c.e.<sc>for Or. 3); 1986: 449 and 460. 
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3 Tentatively identified by Behr 1968a: 59n60 as Sextus Julius Capito, son of Menophantes, 
known from Inschr. von Pergamon 8.2.428 and IGRR 4.386. 
4 Collected edition: Trapp 2016: 7–11. Scholia: W. Dindorf, Aristides vol. 3 (Leipzig: 
Reimer, 1829), 356–734. Sopater’s prolegomena: Dindorf 3.433–39, 744–57; Lenz 1959. For 
studies of aspects of the early reception of Aristides, see Harris and Holmes 2008: 253–93 
(the chapters by Jones, Cribiore and Quattrocelli) and Miletti 2017. 
5 Behr 1968b: 186–99; Jackson, Lycos and Tarrant 1998. 
6 They are items 41–43 in the Giuntine and 45–47 in translations and editions from Canter 
(1566) to Dindorf. For 19th and early 20th c. dismissals, see Baumgart 1874: 20–21; 
Boulanger 1923: 210–70 and 441–44; Geffcken 1928: 105–7. Although he devotes the 
majority of his chapter on Aristides’ view of oratory to the Platonics, Boulanger is bitingly 
dismissive of both their content and their form. Something of the dismissive tone persists in 
Francophone scholarship in Reardon 1971: 120–54. Cf. also Dittadi 2008: 114–15. 
7 So, in one version or another, Pernot 1993, Michel 1993, Kasulke 2005, Dittadi 2008 and 
2012, Miletti 2017; Milazzo 2002 allows for an inner struggle on Aristides’ part, between his 
“two souls, the one of polemic and proud confrontation, and the other more inclined to 
compromise and conciliation” (153), but still on balance privileges the latter (24–30, 225–27, 
283, etc.). The only study to diagnose a more aggressive approach on Aristides’ part, 
Flintermann 2000-1, does so in connection with only one strand in his argument (the attack 
on Plato’s factual accuracy); but note also a comment by Holford-Strevens 2007: 422, 
reviewing Kasulke: “there is malice in ‘father and teacher of orators’ (§465, cf. Cic. De or. 
1,47) and … in or. 4 his claws are far sharper than the feeble Capito’s”. 
8 Trapp 2017a: 326–31. 
9 Trapp 2007: 245–56; cf. also Trapp 2017b: 36–51. 
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10 Hunter 2012, in which the Platonic Orations feature only very briefly and tangentially, on 
pp. 181–83; Fowler 2018: 232–36. 
11 Or. 2.465.   
12 Or. 4.1. 
13 Or. 3.42; 461, 557, 663; 607; cf. Flintermann 2000–1: 37–38. 
14 Sacred Tales 50.14, 50.19; 50.55–57; 51.61–63. 
15 On standards in ancient philosophical argumentation, see Laks 2016 and Bonazzi 2016. 
16 Pace Pernot 1993: 317, “sa méthode sera rhétorique, et plus précisément judiciaire”;  and 
Fowler 2018:234. “Political” or “administrative” is closer than “judicial.” In this connection 
it is interesting to note how the Aristides Prolegomena deal with what they constitute as the 
knotty problem of how to characterise Or. 3 generically–precisely not as judicial, in their 
view (Σ 3.434.30–435.3, 437.2–12 Dindorf; Lenz 1959: 160.6–161.2, 171.13–20). 
17 Or. 2.21, 52; Dittadi 2008: 117–18, 122. 
18 As for instance in Or. 3.221 and 275–77. 
19 Or. 2.344–45 and 346–61; resumed and supplemented with further material from other 
dialogues, Or. 3.511–76. 
20 Or. 3.103–5; cf. e.g. 3.57–59 (discrepancy in the verdicts passed on Pericles’ oratorical 
ability in Gorgias and Menexenus), 3.513–31 (Plato both damning the Four as flatterers in the 
Gorgias and declaring that they didn’t practice the arts of flattery). 
21 Esp. Grg. 482b2–6, where Socrates underlines the manifest falsehood of Callicles’ beliefs 
by asserting that not even he will be in agreement with himself.  
22 Karadimas 1996: 163, cited by Flintermann 2000–1: 52n105; Aristides himself only 
directly alludes to the Socratic insistence near the end of Or. 3 (643). 
23 For a summary of Cicero’s and Quintilian’s engagements with Plato and the Gorgias, see 
Vickers 1989: 163–70. 
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24 The myth of Protagoras (320c–22d) is rewritten in Or. 2.394–99, and the treatment of the 
sophists in its opening scene (314e–16a) is analysed in Or. 3.602–4. 
25 Dittadi 2008: 118 rightly speaks of Plato’s text in the Platonic Orations as an “oggetto di 
studio e di interpretazione” and the Orations themselves as therefore a “documento nella 
storia dell’esegesi del testo di Platone.” Compare also Fowler 2018: 236, making the 
interesting point that Aristides’ attempt, by close examination of individual passages, to 
divide Plato against himself, goes in exactly the opposite direction to that of his Middle 
Platonic exegetes, who seek at all costs to unify and reconcile his diverging strands. 
26 He returns to Plato’s typology of technai and forms of “flattery” in 2.234–36 and 3.588–
604. 
27 Cf. again Behr 1968b and Jackson et al. 1998, as in n5 above; also Dodds 1959: 58–60. 
28 Plutarch, Moralia 1033a–58d, 1086c–1107c, 1107d–27e; on Plutarch’s polemical style and 
strategies, see Dillon (forthcoming). 
29 Menex. 245e; cf. Athen. Deipn. 5.217c. 
30 Symp. 185c; Phdr. 274c. 
31 Especially Flintermann 2000–1; Flintermann however makes the attack on Plato’s 
fictionalizing central to Aristides’ strategy, rather than a subordinate part of a larger plan. 
32 Ep. II 314c; Aristides’ text at this point needs more attention than Behr, following Reiske, 
gives it.  As my translations suggests, we need also, besides the supplement <ὁ δὲ οὐ 
γράψας>, a colon or full stop after γεγονότος and a question mark after γέγραφεν. 
33 Cf. Milazzo 2002: 500. 
34 The closest parallel I can think of for this kind of display of technical philosophy-speak 
comes in the tenth Oration of Maximus of Tyre (10.5); in the Platonic Orations, cf. e.g., 
3.172 and 204 (with a more overtly parodic tone). 
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35 Orr. 3.302, 390 (ὦ θαυμάσιε); 3.135, cf. 3.266, 2.372 (ὦ … κεφαλή); 2.275, 3.402, 3.644 
(ὦ τᾶν). 
36 Milazzo 2002: 47, 119, 136, 200–2, 270, 287, 334, 509; Dittadi 2008. 
37 Refutatio sententiae: Aristotle, Rhet. 2.21.13, 1395a18–b1, with Davies (1991: 55–56) on 
Soph. Trach 1–5. Paraphrasis: Theon, Progymn. 62–64 Spengel; Quint. Inst. 1.9.2 and 
10.5.4–8. 
38 Nightingale 1995: 60–92 (tragedy), 93–132 (encomiastic genres), 133–71 (miscellaneous 
forms linked by claims to “authenticity,” 172–92 (comedy), 193–95 (summary, nb 95: 
“[Plato] deliberately violates the boundaries he has drawn”). 
39 Orr. 2.450 and 3.509, as on p. [23] below. 
40 Or. 3.632: “I think the whole business is in fact a joke: because who does not know that 
Socrates and Callicles and Gorgias and Polus are all Plato, turning the argument whichever 
way he pleases?” 
41 Aristides’ use of this episode is also the main issue in Or. 4. 
42 Pernot 1993: 324–25. 
43 Or. 4.28–50. 
44 See again Vickers 1989: 163–70, as in n23 above. 
45 Cf. Flintermann 2000–1: 46–49. 
46 Most recently and extensively Milazzo 2016: 83–96, written apparently in ignorance of 
Hunter 2012: 181–84, and Geffcken 1929: esp. 105–7. Like Aristides, Dionysius protests his 
underlying respect and admiration for Plato, stigmatises him for his mean-spirited criticism 
and philotimia, and uses his attacks on his predecessors as justification for his own on him: 
Ep. Pomp. 756–57, 764. 
47 Athenaeus, Deipn. 5.217c–218e. 
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48 Deipn. 5.215f.  On Herodicus, see Düring 1941, and on the context in Athenaeus, Trapp 
2000. 
49 An aspect utterly missed by Kasulke 2005: 148–50, and not given much weight by any 
recent study. 
50 In both these passages Aristides is implicitly rejecting and rewriting Plato’s schema in the 
Gorgias, in which oratory is damned as “the shadow image of a part of politics” (463d). 
51 Prt. 320c–323a.  
52 Aristides is here paying Plato back in kind for his use of the helmsman comparison to insist 
that being able to save lives is no great thing for orators to boast of, in Grg. 511c–12b. 
53 E.g., Lucian Piscator 29–37; Hermot. 11, 80–83; Symp. passim. 
54 Quint. Inst. 1 Praef. 9–17, 2.15.5–31; cf. Vickers 1989: 167–70. 
55 Bernays 1879: 100–4; Behr 1968a: 94 n. 2; 1986: 449; cf. Boulanger 1923: 249–65, esp. 
259–65. 
56 E.g., Orr. 2.11–20; 3.499–510, 627–31; 4.48–51. 
57 On Aristides’ ventures in competitive self-projection, see Bowie 2012 (esp. 229–36), 
Downie 2013: 28–34, Trapp 2016: 14–16. 
58 Or. 3.76, 97, 156, 499–510, 663–64, 678, 693. 
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